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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Justin Loera asserts the district court erred in several respects in this case. First, it erred
by quashing his subpoena duces tecum by not focusing on the standard actually set by the
Criminal Rules governing discovery. Moreover, the district court's evaluation of the competing
interests in that regard was unreasonable because it did not appreciate the defense's need for the
information and it did not consider potential alternatives to protect the State's interest while still
allowing discovery of potentially-exculpatory information. As such, this Court should reverse
the order quashing Mr. Loera's subpoena duces tecum, vacate the judgement of conviction, and
remand this case for further proceedings.
Second, there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's order of restitution
in this case. Specifically, there is no evidence of the actual amount the victim had to pay for
certain treatments and there was no evidence tying other potential treatment to Mr. Loera' s
criminal conduct. For both those reasons, this Court should at least vacate the restitution order.
Finally, the district court erred when it ruled on Mr. Loera's I.C.R. 35 motion by not
addressing one of his claims under that motion. Specifically, Mr. Loera argued he should have
been afforded 202 days of credit for time served, and the record bears that claim out. However,
the district court did not address the issue of credit at all in its order denying the I.C.R. 35
motion. As such, this Court should at least reverse the order denying the I.C.R. 35 motion and
remand this case for an order granting Mr. Loera 202 days for credit for time he has served on
this case.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
As there are several distinct issues in this case, to promote clarity, the specific facts
relevant to each claim of error will be presented in the respective sections of the brief. As an
overview, the State charged Mr. Loera with aggravated battery on certain personnel resulting
from an incident between Mr. Loera and a prison guard.

(R., pp.24-25.) A jury ultimately

acquitted Mr. Loera of the aggravated battery charge, convicting him of the included offense of
battery on certain personnel instead. 1

(R., pp.56-57.)

Mr. Loera subsequently admitted a

persistent violator enhancement. (See generally Tr., pp.219-22.) 2 Thereafter, the district court
sentenced Mr. Loera to a unified term of ten years, with five years fixed, to be served
consecutive to his other sentence. (R., pp.70-71.) Mr. Loera filed a notice of appeal timely from
the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.70, 73.)

1

The verdict on the included offense indicates that the jury found that Mr. Loera did not use a
weapon during the battery, as the initial charge had alleged. (See Tr., p.229, L.17 - p.230, L.17.)
2
The transcripts in this case are provided in two independently bound and paginated volume.
The majority of the transcripts are contained in the pdf file "Appeal Transcript Record" and are
referred to herein as "Tr." The transcript of the hearing on the motion to quash the subpoena is
contained in its own separate pdf file, "Reporters Supplemental Transcript Filed - 12-3-18" and
will be referred to herein as "Supp. Tr."
2

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by quashing Mr. Loera's subpoena duces
tecum.

II.

Whether there was not sufficient evidence to support the award of restitution.

III.

Whether the district court erred by not ruling on Mr. Loera's motion for credit for time
served, particularly since the record bears out his claim.

3

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Quashing Mr. Loera's Subpoena Duces Tecum

A.

Relevant Facts
Prior to trial, the court clerk issued a subpoena duces tecum on Mr. Loera's behalf which

commanded the Department of Correction to provide "Idaho Maximum Security Institution
Standard Operation Procedures for management of tiers housing STG [security threat group]
inmates, including but not limited to proper conduct by correctional officers and staff."
(Con£ Exh., p.1.)3 The Department of Correction filed a motion to quash that subpoena, arguing
that, if its response policies were to be disclosed to gang members, it would put prison staff at
risk. (R., pp.34-39; Supp. Tr., p.5, L.5 - p.6, L.6.)
Defense counsel argued that the information subpoenaed was necessary to the defense
because the State's investigation reports included allegations that Mr. Loera was a member of an
STG and that he committed the crime in furtherance of gang activity, and as such, they
anticipated the State would present evidence in that regard during the trial in an attempt to show
motive. 4 (R., p.45; Supp. Tr., p.6, Ls.16-19.) Additionally, defense counsel represented that
information was potentially relevant to the defense theory of the case.

To that point, he

explained that the incident in question took place on an STG tier while numerous inmates were
standing around observing the confrontation between Officer Phillips and Mr. Loera. (Supp.
Tr., p.6, Ls.13-14.) As such, Mr. Loera anticipated presenting a defense that his actions were
3

Citations to "Conf. Exh." are to the electronic pdf file "Appeal Confidential Exhibits" and use
the electronic page numbers.
4
Defense counsel acknowledged that, if the district court excluded evidence of gang affiliation
in limine, or if the State agreed to not present such evidence, the subpoena would become
unnecessary. (Supp. Tr., p.7, Ls.8-19.)
4

necessary to prevent future harm to himself from other inmates - that, when Officer Phillips
confronted him in a way contrary to prison policy, he was, in effect, the initial aggressor, and
thus, Mr. Loera would be perceived as weak if he did not retaliate against Officer Phillips, and in
that scenario, he would become a target of other inmates. (R., p.45; see also Supp. Tr., p.9,
Ls.20-25 (also arguing that, if the officer was acting contrary to the policy, he would be acting
outside of his duties, and Mr. Loera could potentially argue that would disprove the "certain
personnel" element of the charged offense).
Trial counsel also anticipated some potential impeachment value from the policies in
terms of the anticipated testimony from the various responding officers' about how they
evaluated and handled the situation. (Supp. Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.7.) To that point, trial counsel
noted that, in an unrelated preliminary hearing involving a similar situation, another officer had
given contradictory testimony about whether there was even a policy that applied to his actions
on the STG tier. (Supp. Tr., p.8, Ls.12-19.)
The district court's analysis on this point was primarily focused on whether the
information in the polices would be relevant, and thus, admissible, at trial.

(Supp. Tr., p.6,

Ls.11-12 ("what is the relevance is the question"); Supp. Tr., p.9, Ls.2-4 ("I fail to see how the
policies and procedures are relevant to any issue in the case."); Supp. Tr., p.10, Ls.14-21
("I don't think it's proper at all. What everybody did is relevant. That's what we'll get into ....
And that doesn't have anything to do with what policies or procedures are in place.").) It added
that, in its opinion, the risk to the Department from disclosure was high and the defense need was
nonexistent. (Supp. Tr., p.11, Ls.5-12.) As a result, it granted the motion to quash the subpoena.
(Supp. Tr., p.10, Ls.11-13.)

5

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate courts review a decision to grant or deny a motion to quash a subpoena for

an abuse of discretion.

State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 12 (2013). The district court abuses its

discretion when: (1) it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion; (2) it acts beyond the
outer bounds of its discretion; (3) it acts inconsistently with the applicable legal standards, or
(4) it reaches its decision without exercising reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856,
863-64 (2018). In this case, the district court's decision was erroneous under the second, third,
and fourth prongs of the abuse-of-discretion standard.

C.

The District Court's Analysis Was Contrary To The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision In
Joy
The first problem with the district court's analysis is that its decision was based on its

evaluation of whether the requested information would be relevant to the trial. (E.g., Supp.
Tr., p.6, Ls.11-12 ("what is the relevance is the question").) That analysis runs directly contrary
to the applicable legal standards articulated by the Supreme Court in Joy.
A motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum is governed by I.C.R. 17(b). Joy, 155 Idaho
at 12.

That rule provides:

"The court on motion may quash or modify the subpoena if

compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive." I.C.R. 17(b). Based on the plain language of
that rule, the Joy Court concluded that the potential relevance to that information at trial was not
the proper focus: "If he discovers evidence that he wishes to offer at trial, the district court will
have the opportunity to consider its relevance at that time." 5 Joy, 155 Idaho at 13. The focus of
the discovery rules, on the other hand, is on whether it would be overly burdensome for the

5

In Joy, the district court had granted a motion to quash a subpoena based on its conclusion that
the information sought in the subpoena would not be relevant to the trial under I.R.E. 412. Joy,
155 Idaho at 12-13.
6

subpoenaed party to comply the request, such that compilation of the requested documents would
be unreasonable. See id. at 12-13. Thus, the Joy Court held, under I.C.R. 17(b), "a trial court
does not have discretion to restrict a defendant's access to potentially admissible evidence
because some of it might be irrelevant."

Id. at 13.

By drawing this distinction between

discovery and relevance at trial, the Joy Court made it clear the standard for obtaining discovery
is lower than the standard for relevance and admissibility at trial.
Here, as in Joy, the district court's primary focus in quashing the subpoena was
improperly on an evaluation of its perceived relevance and admissibility at trial. (Supp. Tr., p.6,
Ls.11-12 ("what is the relevance is the question"); Supp. Tr., p.9, Ls.2-4 ("I fail to see how the
policies and procedures are relevant to any issue in the case."); Supp. Tr., p.10, Ls.14-21 ("I
don't think it's proper at all. What everybody did is relevant. That's what we'll get into ....
And that doesn't have anything to do with what policies or procedures are in place.").)
Therefore, it abused its discretion by quashing the subpoena on that improper basis.
In fact, as in Joy, the subpoena in this case should not have been quashed because the
information sought potentially contained information that could be relevant to impeach the
testimony from the corrections officers, as well as to promote the defense theory or to refute
aspects of the charged offense. See Joy, 115 Idaho at 13 (explaining that, since evidence of
impeachment "is normally admitted under a broad standard," information that could potentially
be impeaching should be broadly discovered as well). As such, like the district court in Joy, the
district court abused its discretion by not acting consistent with the applicable legal standards set
forth in I.C.R. 17(b) and explained in Joy when it quashed Mr. Loera's subpoena duces tecum.
The district court's final statement about the relative risk of any disclosure of these
policies does not change that conclusion. The district court's analysis in that regard does not

7

represent an exercise of reason because it fundamentally misunderstood the potential exculpatory
value to the defense discussed, particularly in regard to its ability to potentially challenge the
credibility of the corrections officers. As Joy explained: "Evidence that goes to credibility of a
complaining witness," the Court reaffirmed, "is normally admitted under a board standard." Joy,
115 Idaho at 13 (citing State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 713 (1976)). This is because there is a Due
Process consideration underlying that analysis: "this Court has held that the State is required by
due process to disclose to the defendant all material exculpatory evidence known to it or in its
possession, including impeachment evidence." Id. at 13 n.8. As such, the district court was
simply wrong when it concluded the defense was engaging in "a fishing expedition" and its need
for the information was "nonexistent."
Moreover, the district court's evaluation of the risk to the Department from dissemination
of that information failed to account for the fact that dissemination of discovered materials is not
an all-or-nothing proposition. Just because information will be discovered to one person, that
does not mean it will be disseminated to the public at large. In fact, the rules provide several
mechanisms to prevent against precisely that while still allowing the parties broad discovery.
For example, two different provisions under I.C.R. 16 allow that, when certain sensitive
information needs to be discovered, the release can be limited only to the defense attorney on the
express condition that he or she "must not share the unredacted digital media in any manner
without consent of the prosecuting attorney or an order of the court," and even if the defendant is
allowed to view it, he may not retain a copy of it. I.R.C. 16(b)(9)(A), (d)(2)(A); see also I.R.C.
16(m) (placing even more significant restrictions on the review of discovered sexually-exploitive
materials). That alternative would have completely nullified the risk to the Department and still
would have allowed for the broad discovery required under Joy. Defense counsel even offered

8

assurances along those lines, noting he had no intention of disseminating this information to
other inmates. (Supp. Tr., p.10, L.1-6.)
And while those two provisions may not be directly applicable to this context, there is a
catchall provision which would have allowed the district court to employ that sort of alternative
in this case. Criminal Rule 16(1) expressly authorizes the district court, upon showing of good
cause, to grant a protective order regarding discovered information containing whatever
protective measures the court determined to be appropriate. As such, the district court could
have fashioned a protective order to limit review of the policies to defense counsel and to prevent
its dissemination to others, particularly to other gang members.
That this option was available is particularly important m this case smce the
Department's only articulated concern was for dissemination of this information to gang
members. (R., pp.34-39; Supp. Tr., p.5, L.5 - p.6, L.6.) The Department did not articulate any
concern with defense counsel reviewing the policies. (See generally R.; Supp. Tr.) Since the
district court did not appear to appreciate this aspect of its discretion, it abused its discretion by
quashing the subpoena in this case. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 152 Idaho 21, 23 (Ct. App.
2011) (reiterating that a district court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision without
appreciating the full scope of its discretion). Moreover, with a proper understanding of the scope
of the district court's discretion, it is clear that the district court did not reach its decision in an
exercise of reason because it effectivity confused the risk of discovering this information to
defense counsel with the risk of admitting it in open court.
For any or all those reasons, this Court should reverse the order quashing Mr. Loera's
subpoena duces tecum.

9

II.
There Was Not Sufficient Evidence To Support The Award Of Restitution

A.

Relevant Facts
The State requested restitution in the amount of $1,537.05. (Tr., p.228, Ls.18-20.) In

support of that request, it presented a letter from the State Insurance Fund, which indicated it had
made payments on behalf of Officer Phillips for services provided by Saint Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center, Gem State Radiology LLC, CEP America LLC, 6 and Equian LLC. 7
(Con£ Docs., pp.120-22.) 8 Mr. Loera objected to the restitution request, arguing there was no
evidence showing those costs were actually related to the incident with Mr. Loera, or that they
were, in fact, for an evaluation of Officer Phillips. (Tr., p.240, Ls.6-14.)
The district court noted that "[t]he State should supplement its restitution request by the
receipts, but I will order restitution unless there's a specific objection to a specific receipt
because I think PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder] is a real injury. Just because it's not a
physical -- physically manifested injury, PTSD is real.

It causes real problems for people."

(Tr., p.244, Ls.18-24.) Though neither party had referred to it, the district court was apparently
referencing the victim impact statement, in which Officer Phillips had indicated he was "now
taking medication for a form of PTSD. I have incurred a monetary loss in the fact that I have to

6

According to its website, CEP America is "A Vituity Company," and it is an entity which helps
provide acute care management and staffing solutions to "raise the standard of patient care and
improve their performance metrics." CEP America, https://www.cepamerica.com/ (last accessed
1/22/2020); Vituity, "Who We Are," https://www.vituity.com/about-us/ (last accessed
1/22/2020).
7
According to its website, Equian is an "end-to-end payment integrity organization" which
manages healthcare claims and payments. Equian, "About Equian," https://www.equian.com/
about/ (last accessed 1/22/2020).
8
Citations to "Con£ Docs." refer to the pdf file "ConfDocs.Rec.-Loera" and use the electronic
page numbers.
10

pay for my medication and out of pocket Co-Pay for my Dr. I can not [sic] use Workman's
Comp for this due to the fact they do not cover this form of injury." (Con£ Docs. p.124.)
Officer Phillips did not indicate how much money he had actually spent on the PTSD medication
or the co-pay for the psychiatrist. (See generally Conf. Docs.) There is no other mention of
PTSD or a psychiatric evaluation of Officer Phillips in the record.

(See generally R.;

Con£ Docs.)
The prosecutor subsequently requested clarification regarding what the district court
wanted it to supplement with, and he argued that the letter from the State Insurance Fund was
sufficient to prove the actual loss. (Tr., p.245, Ls.4-11.) In response, the district court said it
would sign the order in absence of a precise objection. (Tr., p.245, Ls.12-13.) Defense counsel
renewed his precise objection - that there was not sufficient evidence to support he award - and
reiterating that there was no indication that these costs were even for an evaluation of Officer
Phillips. (Tr., p.245, L.22 - p.246, L.2.) The district court reaffirmed, "Supplement the record,
but I'm going to go on along since this is what the State Insurance Fund has paid out, I'm going
to stick with it unless there's a specific objection, I am going to require that the State provide
additional documentation within the next 30 days." (Tr., p.246, Ls.3-9.)
Despite instructing the State to supplement its request within thirty days, the district court
entered an order for restitution in the amount of $1,537.05 on the day after the sentencing
hearing.

(R., pp.67-68.)

To date, according to the online repository, the State has not

supplemented its restitution request.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a decision to order restitution, the appellate court will defer to the

district court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153

11

Idaho 882, 886 (2013). However, it will exercise free review over the application of the law to
the facts. Id.

C.

There Was No Evidence Of The Actual Amount Paid For The Psychiatric Evaluation
And Medication, And So, The Restitution Award Cannot Be Supported On That Basis
The district court's primary reason for ordering restitution was based on Officer Phillips'

assertion that he had an unquantified out-of-pocket expense related to care for his PTSD.
(Tr., p.244, Ls.18-24.) Restitution may be awarded for "any economic loss which the victim
actually suffers" as a result of the conduct for which the defendant has been found guilty.
LC.§ 19-5304(2); State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 2012). Economic loss is
defined by the statute and includes "direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical
expenses resulting from the criminal conduct." LC. § 19-5304(1)(a). As such, out-of-pocket
expenses related to care for a psychiatric injury caused by the defendant's criminal conduct
would be potentially recoverable in restitution.
However, in order to prove that such losses are actually recoverable under that statute, the
State must prove the out-of-pocket losses.

See, e.g., State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114-15

(Ct. App. 2008) (reiterating that the amount of the economic loss must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence). The Idaho Supreme Court has explained out-of-pocket losses
are "consisting of or requiring an actual cash outlay," and "actually" is something "existing in
fact or reality." Id. Accordingly, to meet its burden of proof, the State has to show how much
money the victim actually spent.
In this case, the State simply has not presented any evidence identifying how much
Officer Phillips actually spent on the psychiatric evaluation and medications. The victim impact
statement notes that he incurred "a monetary loss" in that regard, but that does not identify how

12

much was actually spent in that regard. 9 (See generally Conf. Docs., p.124.) The State did not
provide any other evidence on that point. (See generally Conf. Docs.; R.) Rather, all it provided
was a payment for a physical examination through Saint Alphonsus, Gem State Radiology, and
their administrative partners. (See Conf. Docs., pp.120-22.) Therefore, there is nothing to tie the
amount of restitution requested by the State to the actual loss suffered due the psychiatric issues
identified by Officer Phillips. Since the State failed to prove the actual loss in that regard, there
is not sufficient evidence to support the restitution award on that basis.
And even if the treatments by Saint Alphonsus which are recounted in the State Insurance
Fund's letter could be presumed to include a psychiatric evaluation, 10 that would not justify the
district court's decision to award the entire restitution request. It would only justify the portion
of those evaluations which were related to the psychiatric justification. Cf State v. Cunningham,
161 Idaho 698, 701-02 (2017) (holding that, where the State failed to provide an itemized
accounting of the amount spent on various tasks, it had failed to provide sufficient evidence of
the losses "actually incurred" under LC. § 37-2732(k)). 11 This is where the State's failure to
provide the receipts, despite the district court's repeated instructions to do so, is particularly
telling, since those receipts may have provided that precise sort of information (if, in fact, it
exists). As such, even if this Court were to presume the psychiatric evaluation was included in

9

In certain contexts, a victim's estimation of his actual loss may be sufficient to meet the
preponderance standard. See, e.g., State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 823 (Ct. App. 2010).
However, that does not apply in this case, where no estimation was included in the record. The
only information in the record is that there was simply "a monetary loss." (Conf. Docs., p.124.)
10
Given the applicable burdens of proof, such a presumption would be entirely inappropriate.
See, e.g., Straub, 153 Idaho at 889-90; Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 495; Card, 146 Idaho at 114-15.
11
Cunningham also noted the difference between the restitution statute at issue in that case,
which required proof of the loss "actually incurred" with other statutes, such as attorney's fees
statutes, which allowed for recovery of "reasonable fees" as opposed to actual fees.
Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 702 (also asserting it was looking to the principles underlying the
general restitution statute, LC. § 19-5304, in reaching that conclusion).
13

the State Insurance Fund's letter, this Court should still vacate the entire restitution award in this
case because the entire amount awarded was not supported by sufficient evidence and it is not
possible to discern how much of that award was specifically for the loss associated with the
psychiatric evaluation and medication.

D.

There Was No Evidence Demonstrating That The Physical Examinations Mentioned In
The State Insurance Fund's Letter Were The Result Of Mr. Loera's Criminal Conduct,
And So, The Restitution Award Cannot Be Supported On That Basis Either
The restitution award was not appropriate based on letter from the State Insurance Fund

because the State failed to provide evidence showing that the listed examinations were a result of
the incident with Mr. Loera. (Tr., p.240, Ls.6-10.) All it shows is that a physical examination
was conducted. The Court of Appeals has already held that such evidence is not enough to
satisfy the State's burden under LC. § 19-5304. Card, 146 Idaho 111.
In Card, the victim sought restitution for various homeopathic treatments which she
asserted were necessary to treat conditions caused by automobile accident with the defendant,
who was driving under the influence. Id. at 115. The Court of Appeals pointed out that "[t]here
were no physicians' letters or notes, hospital records or any medical evidence of any kind
indicating that a medical professional had found either that [the victim] suffered from any
identifiable physical condition treated by the [procedures in question], or that such condition was
causally related to the automobile collision." Id. (emphasis altered).

Without that sort of

evidence, the Court concluded, the restitution award for the cost of those procedures was not
supported by substantial evidence. Id.
Here, as in Card, the victim has claimed restitution for a series of procedures which the
State asserted were to address the effects of Mr. Loera's conduct, but there are no physicians'
letters or notes and there are no hospital records for Officer Phillips which actually prove that

14

assertion. (See generally R., Con£ Docs., ConfExh.) There is nothing, for example, to indicate
that the examinations were of the head or knee which, during the trial, the officer had mentioned
being hurt, or whether they were some other, unrelated condition. Restitution is to be based on
proof of actual losses caused by the defendant's criminal conduct, not bare assertions. See Card,
146 Idaho at 115; accord Straub, 153 Idaho at 889-90; Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 495. Therefore,
as in Card, the Insurance Fund's letter does not constitute sufficient evidence to support the
district court's restitution award.
Since there was not sufficient evidence to prove the actual loss on either of the bases
asserted below, the restitution award should be vacated.

III.
The District Court Erred By Not Ruling On Mr. Loera's Motion For Credit For Time Served,
Particularly Since The Record Bears Out His Claim

A.

Relevant Facts
The district court did not address the question of credit for time served in the judgment of

conviction, nor did that issue come up during the sentencing hearing.

(See generally

R., pp.70-71; Tr., pp.226-46.) However, trial counsel subsequently filed a motion under I.C.R.
35, asking for a reduction of the imposed sentence "as well as for credit [for] time served from
date of service of warrant to imposition of judgment." (R., p.77.) In his memorandum in support
of that motion, trial counsel asserted that Mr. Loera was entitled to 202 days of credit for
prejudgment incarceration. (R., p.79.) The district court denied Mr. Loera's I.C.R. 35 motion
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without so much as mentioning the motion for credit for time served.

(See generally Aug.

pp.1-2.)12

B.

Standard Of Review
A determination as to "[w ]hether the district court properly applied the law governing

credit for time served is a question of law over which" appellate courts exercise free review.
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). On appeal, the appellate court will "defer

to the district court's findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous." Id.

C.

The Record Clearly Shows That Mr. Loera Is Entitled To Credit For Pre-Judgment
Incarceration, And So, The District Court Erred By Not Granting His Motion For That
Credit
Mr. Loera clearly included a motion for credit as a part of his I.C.R. 35 motion, as he

asked for a reduction of his sentence "as well as credit for time served from the date of service of
warrant to imposition of judgment." (R., p.77.) Criminal Rule 35(c) expressly allows for the
defendant to ask the district court to award credit for time served. Mr. Loera' s memorandum in
support of that motion expressly argued that he was entitled to 202 days of credit for time served.
(R., p.79.)

The record bears out Mr. Loera's request for 202 days of credit. The minutes of his
initial arraignment state that he was in custody at that time. (R., p.15.) Although a bond was set
in this case, there is no indication that Mr. Loera ever posted that bond. (See generally R.) In
fact, the minutes of various hearings reveal that he was in custody throughout the pendency of
this case. (E.g., R., pp.21, 30, 32, 44, 47, 49, 66; see also Tr., p.71, Ls.5-10 (the district court
12 A motion to augment the record with a copy of the district court's order denying the I.C.R. 35
motion has been filed contemporaneously with this brief
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addressing a situation in which one of the jurors saw the defendant in handcuffs during a recess
in the trial, which indicates he remained in custody at the time of trial).) That is not surprising,
since this incident occurred while Mr. Loera was serving another sentence and he had not
completed that other sentence by the time this case resolved. (See R., p.25 (alleging the crime
occurred in prison); R., p.71 (ordering the sentence in this case to run consecutive "to the
sentence he is currently serving").) As such, the record demonstrates that Mr. Loera remained in
pretrial incarceration on this case from his initial arraignment on August 8, 2018, (R., p.15), until
his sentence was imposed on February 25, 2019. (R., p.66).
The case law is clear that Mr. Loera is entitled to credit for that time served in this case.

E.g., State v. Brand, 162 Idaho 189, 192-93 (2017); State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 4 (2015). The
time span between August 8, 2018, and February 25, 2019, is 202 days. (See R., p.79.)
Since the record clearly supports Mr. Loera's claim for credit for that time served, this
case should, at least, be remanded with instructions for the district court to enter an order
granting Mr. Loera 202 days of credit for time served.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Loera respectfully requests this Court reverse the order quashing his subpoena duces

tecum, vacate the judgement of conviction, and remand this case for further proceedings.
Alternatively, he requests this Court vacate the restitution award and direct the district court to
enter an order granting him 202 days for credit for time served.
DATED this 6th day of February, 2020.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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